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visual	 and	 linguistic	 cues.	 The	 storylines	 and	 characters	 explore	 the	 nature	 of	
animacy	 and	 relationships	 between	 conspecifics	 and	 ‘others’.	 	 Our	 analysis	
focuses	on	 the	use	of	 referring	expressions	as	 they	reflect	 the	animacy	of	 their	
referents,	 as	 it	 develops	 and	 changes	 during	 the	 course	 of	 the	 narrative.	 We	
relate	 these	 findings	 to	 well-established	 scales	 of	 animacy	 which	 link	 our	
perception	of	the	world	to	the	categories	imposed	by	language.	We	find	that,	as	
predicted	by	models	of	animacy	proposed	by	Dahl	(2008)	and	Yamamoto	(1999),	
among	 others,	 shifts	 in	 reference	 –	 specifically	 from	 common	 noun	 to	 proper	
noun	 to	 pronoun,	 and	 from	 collective	 to	 individuated	 referents	 –	 reflect	
characters’	 shifting	 conceptualisation	 of,	 and	 empathy	 with,	 each	 other.	 We	
argue	that	referring	expressions	are	used	at	key	points	in	the	film	script	to	subtly	
mediate	accessible	 cues	 to	animacy	 like	eyes,	 speech	and	motion,	 and	 to	guide	
viewers’	 empathies	 and	 allegiances,	 extending	 our	 understanding	 of	 animacy	
beyond	ordinary	anthropocentrism.	
	























































































































































































































































































































































































































































(4)	 RC	Car:		 	 Whirr!!	Whirrrr-whirrrrr!!	
Rex:		 	 	 Hey	everyone!	RC’s	trying	to	say	something!	




















































































































































































































Buzz:		 			 Excuse	me,	I	think	the	word	you’re	looking	for	is	Space		 	
Ranger.	
Woody:		 The	word	I’m	searching	for	I	can’t	say	because	there’s	pre-
school	toys	present.		(28)	
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In	the	alternative	world	of	the	film,	toys	occupy	an	intermediate	position	in	the	
animacy	schema.	While	most	are	fully	anthropomorphic,	sentient	and	otherwise	
share	identical	properties	with	humans,	their	relationship	to	actual	humans	in	
the	film	is	complex.	When	humans	are	present,	the	toys	de-animate,		which	
necessarily	assigns	them	a	lower	position	on	the	animacy	scale.	The	‘company’	
metaphor	adopted	in	the	film	sees	the	toys	as	staff	working	for	human	employers	
within	a	hierarchy.	At	the	same	time,	the	toys	are	clearly	a	distinct	species	from	
the	real	pet	animals	which	also	populate	the	film.		
Returning	to	the	radial	diagram	shown	in	Figure	1,	the	system	of	animacy	
within	the	alternative	world	of	the	toys	can	be	seen	as	a	shifted	version	of	this	
anthropocentric	worldview,	with	toys	occupying	the	central	node	(equivalent	to	
humans).	In	this	world,	then,	humans	may	be	seen	as	equivalent	to	Supernatural	
Beings,	occupying	a	separate,	higher	node	–	revered	but	little	understood.	Buzz’s	
conviction	that	he	is	an	actual	human	(with	supernatural	properties,	including	
flight)	makes	him	guilty	of	hubris	in	the	eyes	of	the	other	toys.		
Throughout	the	first	half	of	the	film,	Buzz	continues	to	deny	his	toyhood.	
He	convinces	himself	that	he	can	fly	when	he	bounces	off	a	rubber	ball	and	is	
accidently	propelled	into	the	air,	landing	safely	at	the	other	side	of	the	room.	In	
the	end,	he	is	faced	with	irrefutable	evidence:	he	sees	a	television	commercial	for	
Buzz	Lightyear	toys.	His	eyes	widen	as	the	announcer	intones	“Not	a	flying	toy”,	
cutting	to	a	shot	of	rows	of	boxes	of	identical	toy	Buzz	Lightyears	stacked	on	
shelves.	He	looks	down	as	his	wrist	and	reads	“MADE	IN	TAIWAN”.	Stunned	and	
dejected,	Buzz	sees	an	open	window	at	the	top	of	the	stairs.	He	pops	his	wings	
open	and	leaps	up	towards	the	window.	In	slow	motion,	he	starts	to	fall,	landing	
at	the	bottom	of	the	stairs	next	to	his	arm,	which	has	broken	off	on	impact.		
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This	scene	draws	together	many	threads	related	to	animacy	which	lead	to	
a	moment	of	self-awareness	for	Buzz,	of	his	own	toyhood	and	by	extension,	his	
mortality.	First,	in	the	ad	Buzz	hears	himself	referred	to	with	an	indefinite	noun,	
“a	toy”.	The	images	of	rows	of	identical	dolls	further	de-individuate	him;	he	is	no	
longer	a	unique	individual,	but	a	member	of	a	huge	set	of	identical	action	figures.	
The	“MADE	IN	TAIWAN”	label	is	evidence	that	he	is	mass-produced	plastic,	not	
flesh.	Finally,	his	fall	reduces	him	to	component	body	parts,	and	echoes	the	myth	
of	Icarus,	also	punished	for	his	hubris.	Buzz’s	realisation	resonates	with	
theological	and	philosophical	questions	around	the	human	condition,	and	the	
viewer	naturally	empathizes	with	this	trope	of	a	deluded	‘hero’	who	is	brought	
roughly	back	to	earth.	Only	when	Buzz	reaches	this	state	of	self-awareness	does	
he	become	–	morally	–	fully	‘human’.		
With	this	realization,	Buzz	faces	an	identity	crisis,	and	refers	to	himself	
with	an	indefinite	NP:	“No,	Woody,	for	the	first	time	I	am	thinking	clearly.	You	
were	right	all	along.	I’m	not	a	space	ranger.	I’m	just	a	toy.	A	stupid	little	
insignificant	toy.”	In	terms	of	animacy,	Buzz	is	a	complex	figure.	He	is	a	
manufactured	toy,	neither	supernatural	nor	truly	‘free’,	but	he	is	capable	of	
emotion,	altruism,	cleverness	and	self-consciousness,	all	hallmarks	of	being	
human.	Eventually	he	comes	to	terms	with	his	status,	and	discovers	that	even	as	
a	toy	he	is	still	capable	of	great	heroism.	Ironically,	accepting	that	he	is	a	toy	
makes	him	human	(Figure	3).		
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Figure	3:	Buzz	achieves	self-awareness	
	
	
Discussion	and	Conclusion	
	
In	this	study,	we	have	explored	how	linguistic	reference	maintains	cues	to	
relative	animacy	and	helps	align	viewers’	empathies	in	a	fictional	world.	
Our	analysis	of	the	Toy	Story	film	suggests	that	non-linguistic	cues	interact	with	
referential	language	to	support	distinctions	of	relative	animacy	along	the	entire	
animacy	hierarchy.	The	relative	animacy	invoked	in	the	film	is	best	
conceptualised	with	the	help	of	a	radial	picture	(Fig.	1,	adapted	from	Yamamoto	
1999),	in	which	anthropomorphic	beings	are	at	the	center,	with	all	other	
categories	viewed	in	relation	to	humans	but	not	in	relation	to	one	another.	The	
use	of	referential	expressions	serves	to	help	communicate	the	film’s	
conceptualisation	of	the	relative	animacy	and	positioning	of	its	toy	characters.		
Our	analysis	shows	the	applicability	of	subhierarchies	of	animacy	
proposed	in	the	literature	(Comrie	1981,	Cherry	1992,	Chen	2012).	In	addition	to	
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forms	of	expression	used	in	standard	accessibility	scales,	we	also	found	the	use	
of	nicknames	to	be	revealing	as	an	indicator	of	familiarity,	conspecificity	and	
empathy.	Although	referential	forms	and	levels	of	animacy	are	not	mapped	
directly	onto	one	another,	there	is	a	clear	relation	between	them,	and	referential	
language	is	used	in	the	film	to	effectively	signal	subtle	animacy	distinctions.	
As	a	work	of	children’s	fiction,	Toy	Story	builds	on	a	modern	construal	of	
children’s	cognitive	development,	including	their	interest	in	relative	and	
potential	animacy.	The	target	audience	of	Toy	Story	is	made	up	of	young	children	
with	malleable	notions	of	animacy,	and	a	still	developing	understanding	of	the	
implicit	relationships	between	referential	expressions,	referents	and	semantic	
properties.	Although	even	infants	show	sensitivity	to	the	animate-inanimate	
distinction,	comprehension	of	the	interacting	cues	to	animacy	has	a	long	
developmental	trajectory	over	the	first	decade	of	life	(Gelman	&	Opfer	2010,	
Rakison	&	Poulin-Dubois	2001),	and	is	subject	to	cross-cultural	variation	(Atran	
et	al.	2001,	Carey	1985).	Similarly,	the	literature	on	pragmatic	development	has	
shown	that,	while	children	are	sensitive	to	some	pragmatic	cues	early	in	
linguistic	development,	many	pragmatic	skills	emerge	slowly.	Children	do	not	
show	adult-like	attainment	in	either	production	or	comprehension	of	referential	
expressions	even	by	the	age	of	eight	or	nine	(Matthews	2014),	but	the	film	
cleverly	makes	use	of	both	visual	and	linguistic	cues	to	animacy	to	convey	the	
shifted	animacy	relations	at	play	in	its	fictive	social	world.	Young	children	under	
the	age	of	ten	can	easily	understand	many	cues	to	animacy	used	in	the	film	(and	
by	toy	manufacturers).	Referential	expressions	are	subtly	employed	to	reinforce	
and	supplement	the	primary	available	cues.		
This	paper	focusses	on	a	narrative	intended	for	a	young	audience,	but	we	
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have	not	examined	children’s	own	use	of	referential	expressions	or	their	
comprehension	of	the	animacy	distinctions	portrayed	in	the	film.	This	would	be	
an	interesting	case	for	further	research,	considering	the	use	of	multiple	cues	to	
relative	animacy,	the	narrative	development	of	characters	along	animacy	scales,	
and	the	sometimes	sophisticated	related	concepts	explored	in	the	film.		
The	power	of	referential	language	to	convey	and	subvert	animacy	roles	is	
encapsulated	in	one	more	scene	from	the	film	(109-110),	in	which	Woody	scares	
the	mean	neighbor	boy,	Sid,	by	breaking	the	law	of	de-animating	in	the	presence	
of	humans:	“That’s	right.	I’m	talking	to	YOU,	Sid	Phillips.	We	don’t	like	being	
blown	up,	Sid,	or	smashed,	or	ripped	apart…”	Sid’s	terrified	response	shows	the	
menace	of	realising	that	the	natural	order	of	animacy	has	been	subverted,	
represented	in	a	single	pronoun:	““W-w-w-we?	[...]	
AAAAAAAGGGGGGHHHHHH!!!!!…	The	Toys!	The	toys	are	alive!"		
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i	This	is	a	recurrent	theme	in	child	literature;	see,	for	instance,	classic	stories	like	The	Velveteen	
Rabbit	(Williams,	1922)	and	The	Little	Engine	that	Could	(Piper,	1930).	
36	
	
																																																																																																																																																														
ii	References	from	the	Toy	Story	screenplay	are	from	Whedon	et	al.	(1995).		Hereafter,	all	quotes	
with	no	source	indicated	are	from	this	version	of	the	screenplay,	and	we	refer	to	page	numbers	
only	for	longer	quotes.	
